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Abstract
We show that for every cooperative game a corresponding set game can be defined,
called the standard set game.
Values for set games can be applied to this standard game and determine alloca-
tions for the cooperative game. On the other hand, notions for cooperative games,
like the Shapley value, the τ−value or the core can be considered in the context of
the standard set games.
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1 Introduction
The concept set game was introduced by Hoede in [H 92]. A set game is a pair 〈Ns, vs〉 ,
where Ns is a nonempty, finite set, called the player set and vs : 2Ns → 2Us associates
with every coalition S of players a subset of Us, called the value (worth) of coalition S.
We assume that vs(∅) = ∅. Set games differ from cooperative games in the fact that the
value of a coalition S of Ns players is not a real number, but a set taken from a universe
Us.
Example 1 Let Us = {a, b, c} be the universe and Ns = {1, 2, 3} be the set of players.
The coalitions have the values
vs(∅) = ∅
vs({1}) = {a}
vs({2}) = {a, b}
vs({3}) = {a, b, c}
vs({1, 2}) = {a, b}
vs({1, 3}) = {a, b, c}
vs({2, 3}) = {a, b, c}
vs(Ns) = {a, b, c}.
A solution ψ on the set of all set games G associates a so-called allocation ψ(Ns, vs) =
(ψi(Ns, vs))i∈Ns ∈ (2Us)Ns with every set game 〈Ns, vs〉. For every i ∈ Ns, ψi represents
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the items that are given , according to the solution ψ, to player i from participating in
the game.
Several solutions were proposed for set games (see [A94], [DS01a], [DS01b] and [SZL99]).
As stated in [DS01b], these solutions can be included in the class of semi-marginalistic
values. A semi-marginalistic value ψ on the set game space G has the following form
ψi(Ns, vs) =
⋃
S⊆Ns
Si
[vs(S)−∇vsS,i], for all 〈Ns, vs〉 ∈ G and all i ∈ Ns,
where ∇vsS,i is a set determined by the worth of a certain collection of coalitions, somehow
determined by S and/or i. For example, by choosing ∇vsS,i := vs(S − {i}) one obtains the
individually marginalistic value (IM) introduced in [A94], by choosing ∇vsS,i :=
⋃
j∈S
vs(S −
{j}) one obtains the the overall-individually marginalistic value (OIM) introduced in
[A94], by choosing ∇vsS,i :=
⋃
T⊂S
vs(T ) one obtains the overall-conditionally marginalistic
value (OCM) introduced in [SZL99], and, finally, by choosing ∇vsS,i :=
⋃
T⊆Ns−i
vs(T ) one
obtains the Driessen–Sun value (DS) introduced in [DS01a].
Example 2 The IM solution to the set game introduced in Example 1 is the following
ψ1 = {a}
ψ2 = {a, b}
ψ3 = {a, b, c}.
In many situations, there is a cost associated to each element of the universe Us and
one is interested in how to share the costs between the players. One method of cost sharing
is proposed by Hoede in [H02]. The allocation of the set game determines for each player
i, ψi as a set of elements of Us. If an element uS , S ⊆ N has cost c(uS), then this cost is to
be shared by all players that have uS in their allocation. In the literature people consider
cooperative games on the reals, in the sense that the worth of a coalition is a real number,
usually chosen from R. Our goal is to show the intimate relationship between cooperative
games and set games.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we show that with every cooperative
game (Nc, vc) one can associate a set game 〈Ns, vs〉, using basic units. In Sections 3,4 and
5 we will analyze the relations between several solutions defined for a cooperative game
and the solutions defined on the associated standard set game.
2 The standard set game
Consider a cooperative game (Nc, vc), where Nc is the set of players and vc : 2Nc → R is
a mapping which associates with each coalition S the value of the coalition. We associate
with (Nc, vc) the following set game, called the standard set game associated to (Nc, vc).
The universe Us is Us = {uS′ |S′ ⊂ Nc}, where the elements uS are called basic units.
The set of players Ns is Ns = Nc and vs : 2Ns → 2Us is defined by
vs(∅) = ∅
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and
vs(S) = {uS′ |S′ ⊂ S, S′ 
= ∅}.
Every basic unit uS, S ⊂ Ns, has a cost
c(uS) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |vc(T ). (1)
One can easily verify that for each S, S ⊂ Ns,
vc(S) =
∑
T⊆S
c(uT ). (2)
Remark Note that (2) implies that if for every S ⊆ N , c(uS) ≥ 0, then the cooperative
game (Nc, vc) is monotonic, i.e., if S ⊆ T than v(S) ≤ v(T ), for every S ⊆ N and T ⊆ N .
Example 3
Consider the following cooperative game. Nc = {1, 2, 3} and
vc(∅) = 0
vc(1) = 1
vc(2) = 2
vc(3) = 3
vc(1, 2) = 41
vc(1, 3) = 42
vc(2, 3) = 43
vc(Nc) = 101.
The standard set game associated with (Nc, vc) is defined by
US = {uS′ |S′ ⊂ Nc}, Ns = Nc and
vs(∅) = ∅
vs({1}) = {u{1}}
vs({2}) = {u{2}}
vs({3}) = {u{3}}
vs({1, 2}) = {u{1}, u{2}, u{1,2}}
vs({1, 3}) = {u{1}, u{3}, u{1,3}}
vs({2, 3}) = {u{2}, u{3}, u{2,3}}
vs(Ns) = {u{1}, u{2}, u{3}, u{1,2}, u{1,3}, u{2,3}, u{1,2,3}}.
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From (1), the costs of the basic units are
c(u{1}) = 1
c(u{2}) = 2
c(u{3}) = 3
c(u{1,2}) = 38
c(u{1,3}) = 38
c(u{2,3}) = 38
c(u{1,2,3}) = −19.
Remark
In [A94] and [DS01b] it is proved that for every monotonic set game, i.e., a game for
which vs(T ) ⊆ vs(S), for every T ⊆ S ⊆ Ns, the IM and OIM values coincide.
Clearly, the standard set game 〈Ns, vs〉 associated with a cooperative game (Nc, vc) is
always monotonic. Hence, IM(Ns, vs) = OIM (Ns, vs).
3 The Shapley value
In this section we will first show two ways of obtaining the Shapley value for a cooperative
game (Nc, vc) via the standard set game associated with it.
Let (N, vc) be a cooperative game and 〈N, vs〉 its associated standard set game. Recall
that the Shapley value for (N, vc) is defined as
Shi(N, vc) =
∑
S⊆N
Si
(|S| − 1)!(|N | − |S|)!
|N |! [v(S)− v(S − {i})] .
An equivalent definition of the Shapley value is
Shi(N, vc) =
∑
S⊆N
Si
1
|S|
∑
T :T⊂S
(−1)|S|−|T |vc(T ).
Now consider the solutions IM,OCM and DS for 〈N, vs〉 . From the definition of these
solutions (see Section 1) and the definition of a standard set game follows that
ψi = IM(N, vs) = OCM(N, vs) = DS(N, vs) =
⋃
Si
{uS}.
Consider for this ψi the cost sharing method a = (ai)i∈N defined as described before,
leading to
ai =
∑
S⊆N
Si
1
|S|c(uS). (3)
From (1) follows that
Shi(N, vc) = ai. (4)
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Next we will show how, for a restricted class of games, the Shapley value comes forward
with the help of the excess vector (complaint vector). Suppose that I(vc) 
= ∅. For every
x ∈ I(vc), the excess vector (complaint vector) θ(x) has as its coordinates the excesses
e(S, x) := vc(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi, for every coalition S,
and these excesses are written down in decreasing order. The imputation for which the
complaint vector is lexicographically minimal is called the nucleolus.
Using (2) the excesses can be written as
e(S, x) =
∑
T⊆S
c(uT )−
∑
i∈S
xi.
Suppose now that c(uS) ≥ 0, for all S ⊆ N , and that we are interested in finding an
imputation x that keeps all the excesses negative. A natural way is to proceed as follows.
First set xi = c(ui) for each i ∈ Ns. Clearly, e({i}, x) ≤ 0, for every i ∈ Ns but for S
with |S| ≥ 2 it may happen that e(S, x) > 0. Next we change x such that
e(S, x) ≤ 0 for every S ⊆ N, |S| ≤ 2. (5)
Clearly,
xi = c(u{i}) +
1
2
∑
T⊆S
|T |=2
c(uT ), for every i ∈ N,
satisfies (5). Proceeding in this way, we finally obtain that the imputation
xi =
∑
S⊆N
Si
1
|S|c(uS)
maintains all the excesses non-positive. Obviously, x is exactly the Shapley value for
(N, vc).
We have seen here how one can use the standard set game in order to obtain the
Shapley value. It is very difficult to extend the approach in order to obtain the nucleolus.
The reason for this is that the analytic minimization involved in calculating the nucleolus
is unavoidable and beyond the scope of set games. A similar phenomenon occurs in the
next section.
4 The τ− value
As before, let (N, vc) be a cooperative game with n players. The τ -value is based on two
vectors M(vc) and m(vc). The vector M(vc), respectively m(vc), has as i−th coordinate
Mi(vc) := v(N)− v(N − {i}),
respectively,
mi(vc) := max
S:i∈S
(vc(S)−
∑
j∈S−{i}
Mj(v)).
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The τ -value τc of the game (N, vc) is the unique convex combination, when such a
combination exists, of m(vc) and M(vc) lying in the hyperplane E = {x ∈ Rn|
n∑
i=1
xi =
vc(N)}. Actually, the τ -value is defined for games for which which this convex combination
exists i.e., for quasi-balanced games.
Following the idea behind the τ -value for cooperative games, for standard set games
we may proceed as follows. For Mi we choose what a player can get from the coalitions
to which he belongs and for mi what he can get by himself. This leads to the choices
Mi(vs) =
∑
S:i∈S
c(uS)
and
mi(vs) = c(ui).
Note that the vector M(vc) is in fact equal to M(vs).
Again, we are interested to find a convex combination between m(vs) and M(vs), if it
exists, that lies in the hyperplane E defined above. In other words, we are interested in
finding an α ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
i∈N
[αmi(vs) + (1− α)Mi(vs)] = vc(N). (6)
It is easy to see that such an α exists only if the set game satisfies the following two
conditions:
mi(vs) ≤ Mi(vs), for every i ∈ N
and ∑
i∈N
mi(vs) ≤ vc(N) ≤
∑
i∈N
Mi(vs).
Then, α would be equal to
α =
∑
i∈N
Mi(vs)− vc(N)
∑
i∈N
Mi(vs)−
∑
i∈N
mi(vs)
or, in terms of basic units,
α =
∑
i∈N
∑
Si
c(uS)−
∑
S⊆N
c(uS)
∑
i∈N
∑
Si
c(uS)−
∑
i∈N
c(ui)
.
Note that if it exists, the allocation given by the convex combination in (6) is not neces-
sarily equal to the τ -value associated to the cooperative game. The reason for this is that
analytical expressions such as maximum and minimum of a function cannot be covered by
a set game.
Remark Applying this procedure to the set game in Example 3 we obtain α = 49 and the
following solution for τs = (τs,1, τs,2, τs,3):
τs,1 = 32
2
3
, τs,2 = 33
2
3
, τs,3 = 34
2
3
.
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5 The standard set game and the core
For a cooperative game (Nc, vc) define the set of imputations I(vc) by
I(vc) = {x ∈ R|N ||xi ≥ vc(i), for every i ∈ N}. The core of the game (Nc, vc) is the set
of imputations satisfying x(S) ≥ v(S) for every S ⊆ N and x(N) = v(N), where for a set
S, x(S) =
∑
i∈S
xi. Equivalently, the core is the set of imputations that keep all the excesses
non-positive.
Using (2) we can rewrite the definition of the core as the set of all imputations x
satisfying x(S) ≥ ∑
T⊆S
c(uT ) and x(N) =
∑
T⊆N
c(uT ).
First of all remark that if, in the standard set game, c(uS) ≥ 0 for every S ⊆ N, then
the core is nonempty. In Section 3 we already saw that in this case the Shapley value has
the property that it makes the excesses non-positive. So it is in the core.
In fact, the nonnegativity of the costs of the basic units implies a stronger statement
with respect to (Nc, vc), namely that the game is convex. Recall that (Nc, vc) is convex if
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ), for every S ⊆ N,T ⊆ N.
Using (2), the convexity condition above can be rewritten as
∑
S′⊆S∪T
S′∩(S\T )=∅
S′∩(T\S)=∅
c(uS′) ≥ 0, for every S ⊆ N,T ⊆ N.
It follows immediately that a game for which all basic units have nonnegative costs is
convex. Hence, the core is nonempty and the Shapley value is an element of it.
One would like to formulate a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness
of the core in terms of the costs of the standard set game elements. One way to achieve
this is by simply translating the characterization of non-emptiness given by Bondareva
[B63] and Shapley [S67]. The conditions are that for each set of values αS , S ⊆ N , for
which we have that ∑
Si
αS = 1
it holds that ∑
S⊆N
c(uS)(1−
∑
S⊆S′
αS′) ≥ 0.
Again, we immediately see that this condition is satisfied if c(uS) ≥ 0, for all S ⊆ N .
However, we would like to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions on the c(uS)
only. So far we have not succeeded in this.
6 Discussion
The axiomatization of values for set games was first studied by Aarts, Funaki and Hoede
([AFH97] and [AFH00]). The papers of Driessen and Sun ([DS01a] and [DS01b]) form a
continuation of this work.
In first instance it was somewhat unclear how set games compare to cooperative games.
By the results given in this paper we now know that set games are intimately related
to cooperative games with coalition values in the reals. However, they cover only the
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combinatorial aspect of normal cooperative games. It was for this reason that direct
analogs for the τ -value or the nucleolus could not be found for the standard set game.
Yet the fact that set games may be seen as covering the combinatorial aspect of coop-
erative games has a certain potential. As was shown in [H02] , Example 1 is the set game
that can be defined for the cost sharing problem for three pieces a, b and c, of a landing
strip, to be used by players, planes 1, 2 and 3, where 1 uses a, 2 uses a and b and 3 uses
a, b and c. The solution given in Example 2 gives the basis for the cost sharing solution by
remarking that all the players should pay for a, players 2 and 3 for b and player 3 for c.
The actual costs of the basic units a, b and c are left out of consideration. This situation
seems to prevail in many cost sharing problems. The players are interested in certain basic
units and coalitions can be given a worth equal to the union of these basic units. The
set game that is defined this way captures the combinatorial aspects of the cost sharing
problem. Further considerations on the actual costs of the basic units may then include
the cost sharing based on the set game solution as one of the inputs. This splitting up
of cost sharing problems into a set game part and a part in which only costs are further
considered will be discussed in another paper.
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